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Water distribution network is important in the critical physical infrastructure systems. The paper studies the emergency resource
strategies on water distribution network with the approach of complex network and cascading failures.Themodel of cascade-based
emergency for water distribution network is built.The cascade-basedmodel considers the network topology analysis and hydraulic
analysis to provide amore realistic result. A load redistribution function with emergency recoverymechanisms is established. From
the aspects of uniform distribution, node betweenness, and node pressure, six recovery strategies are given to reflect the network
topology and the failure information, respectively. The recovery strategies are evaluated with the complex network indicators to
describe the failure scale and failure velocity. The proposed method is applied by an illustrative example. The results showed that
the recovery strategy considering the node pressure can enhance the network robustness effectively. Besides, this strategy can reduce
the failure nodes and generate the least failure nodes per time.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure system is a significant and complex system
that supports the normal implementation of urban functions.
Water supply system is one of the indispensable elements in
infrastructure system. By the methods in complex network,
a large number of the systems in the nature and society can
be depicted in the form of network diagram, such as internet
[1], power grid [2], and scientific citation network [3]. Hence,
urban water supply system can be construed as a complex
network with various physical edges. The performance of
water distribution network (WDN) can be studied by the
complex network theory [4].
The robustness of WDN refers to the ability to avoid the
loss of functions and the ability to tolerate errors and failures
after the whole network damage or the components damage.
The study on the robustness is one of the typical issues in
complex network [5]. Cascading failure, as a step-by-step
failure process [6], turns out to be a topic of recent interest
on robustness and network security [7]. A large amount of
loads exist inWDN.The failure of a certain component (such
as breakdown or attack) may redistribute the network load,
which may further lead to the result that certain components
suffer a failure caused by the exceeding of their bearing
capacity. The failures of these components may be likely to
result in a secondary failure and a chain reaction. After that,
a large number of components and even the whole network
may collapse, which cause severe damage to the network.
WDN is a geography-related distributed system. In cor-
relation with geographic space, WDN is highly sensitive
to natural disasters (e.g., earthquake, hurricane) or human
attack (e.g., terrorist attack) [8]. In WDN, the failures of the
critical components arising from the destruction may lead to
people and property loss and even impact the economic and
social development. With the study on the cascading failures
of WDN, Adachi and Ellingwood [9] constructed the service
function assessment model of the urban water distribution
system under the impact of earthquake, with power system
taken as the back-upmeasure. Sitzenfrei et al. [10] established
a cascading risk map with GIS, which involves both hazard
and cascade vulnerability. The applied research showed that
the neglect of cascading events undervalues the risk inWDN.
Yazdani and Jeffrey [11] argued the fact that WDN was a
spatial organization network.The structure and vulnerability
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of the network were studied by complex network. Four
benchmark water networks were measured with the network
paths, cycles, efficiency, and connectivity. Yazdani et al. [12]
studied the structure of Kumasi’s WDN and quantified its
connectivity and redundancy.The relationship between these
metrics and network robustness illustrated that the simple
topological measure only depicted partial network structure
without the ability to describe network property completely.
The assessment on the robustness of WDN should be further
consideredwith hydraulic attributes. Hawick [13] argued that,
after a series of optimizations and designs, WDN developed
into a highly complex network. Shuang et al. [14] established
the node vulnerability analysis model of WDN based on
cascading failures in combination with the network and
hydraulic properties. It was proved that this model could
identify the critical nodes of the system effectively under the
cascading effect. Shuang et al. [15] simulated the reliability
peak and persistent time of cascade propagation in WDN.
The reliability assessment of WDN under cascading effect
should introduce system uncertainties.
It is urgent for the government and society to cope
with the disasters and bring down the losses resulting from
disasters. It is proved that the approach to prevent and control
the spread of disaster events is to explore the evolutionary
mechanism of disaster and then bring forward an effective
strategy. In the cascading failure model of WDN, if the load
exceeds the bearing capacity, system components fail, which
may further trigger the redistribution of network load and
then the secondary failures. In actual life, however, there
always exist emergency response mechanisms to reduce the
loss of failures and restore the normal service function. Upon
the failures ofWDN, external emergency forces can intervene
in the failing components to cope with emergencies and assist
in their restoration.
The paper studies the emergency recovery strategies on
WDN with the approach of complex network and cascading
failures. The model of cascade-based emergency for WDN is
built. The cascade-based model considers the network topol-
ogy analysis and hydraulic analysis to provide amore realistic
result. A load redistribution function with emergency recov-
ery mechanisms is established. From the aspects of uniform
distribution, node betweenness, and node pressure, six recov-
ery strategies are given to reflect the network topology and
the failure information, respectively. The recovery strategies
are evaluatedwith the complex network indicators to describe
the failure scale and failure velocity. The proposed method is
applied by an illustrative example to analyze the impact on
recovery with the six strategies.
2. The Cascade-Based Emergency
Model of WDN
2.1. The Topology Structure. Prior to the simulated com-
putation of WDN, there is a need to store the graphic
information in a certain way and then establish the model
for the WDN. Characterized by the network-like topological
structure, WDN can be analyzed by the graph theory. Since
the water in pipe flows along a certain direction, WDN is a
directed graph [16]. Water reservoirs, consumers, and tanks
can be abstracted as nodes. Pipes, pumps, and valves can be
represented as edges. The neighboring nodes are connected
by pipes. The incidence matrix 𝑁 is used to describe the
relationship between the nodes and pipes in the network.The
number of rows is equivalent to the nodes, and the number
of columns is equivalent to the pipes, respectively.𝑁
𝑖𝑗
in the







1, Node 𝑖 is the initial point of pipe 𝑗
−1, Node 𝑖 is the terminal point of pipe 𝑗
0, Node 𝑖 is the unconnected with pipe 𝑗.
(1)
2.2. Parameters
2.2.1. Load. Load is a significant physical parameter in the
cascading failure model. The dynamic load changes lead to
the cascading failures of the critical infrastructures such as
power grid, water distribution system, gas supply network,
traffic network, and communication network. Load also
exists on the components such as nodes and pipes in WDN.
Both the excessively large and small loads result in the flow
changes, which may further trigger a series of cascading fail-
ures. After attack, the WDN redistributes the water pressure
andflow in the network according to the topological structure
and hydraulic changes. The complex network distributes the
network load according to betweenness. To further study the
cascade propagation of WDN, the node service pressure 𝑃ser
in the normal operation is used as the initial load [14].
2.2.2. Capacity. Capacity is the load that a node can bear. If
the load exceeds its bearing capacity, components suffer from
failures. These failures cause the flow redistribution, leading
to secondary failures.With the increase in operation time and
the expansion in urban size,WDNhas been further expanded
based on the original construction size. Meanwhile, water
demand changes randomly with the requirements of urban
population and industry. As a result of these, the node
pressures are no longer the initial value but they will be
left in a changing state. Therefore, for the water distribution
system that keeps running for a long time, there is a need to
take account of the changes in node pressure and measure
the robustness of WDN by its new constraints. The node
minimum capacity is defined as the acceptable minimum
water pressure 𝑃min
𝑘











is the service pressure of node 𝑘. The service
pressure can be obtained in normal operation. It ensures that
all the water demand can be satisfied. The node maximum
capacity refers to the upper limit of the nodes constrained
by cost or aging. In (2), 𝛼 ≥ 0 expresses the node tolerance,
which implements the control over the intensity of initial
load and load distribution. 𝛼 has evaluated the extra pressure
that a nodes in WDN can bear. 𝛼 has presented a way to
assess the performance of WDN from system perspective.
The greater the value of 𝛼 is, the huger the difference between
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the components will be; that is, the load distribution will be
more nonuniform.
The research focuses on the dynamic changes in WDN.
The network remains stable in the initial stage. The load
of every node is smaller than its capacity. After the failure
occurs, the load on the failure node is distributed to its
neighboring nodes. If the neighboring nodes are unable to
process the extra load (i.e., the load exceeds its capacity), the
neighboring nodes fail and then result in cascading failures.
Equation (3) describes the failure propagation process. If the
redistributed node pressure is within its capacity, the node
can still supply water; otherwise, the node is recognized as
a new avalanched node. The connected pipes are closed to
avoid risk expansion. Consider














2.2.3. Actual Demand. The pressure-driven simulation
method is based on the laws of conservation of mass and
energy to determine pressure and flow distribution. The
pressure-driven simulation method is effective in describing
WDN which can prevent the negative water pressure under
failure conditions. With the help of pressure-driven strategy,
Wagner’s model suggests that there is a relationship between
actual flow and node pressure [17]. This function is widely
applied with the high ability in calculating node demands
[18, 19].
In Wagner’s model, the demand supplied equals the
required one as a customer controls a faucet when the
system capacity is not exceeded [20]. The demand becomes
the maximum allowed by the actual pressure in pressure-
deficient condition. In addition, the node pressure should
be neither too low nor too high. Abnormally high pressures
may cause aging pipes to burst and lose service functions.
Therefore, each node pressure must be controlled between






, the abnormally high-pressure condition occurs.
To avoid risk expansion, it is assumed that the section where
the failure demand node covered is isolated from the rest of
the network. The failure node is removed out of the network
and its connected pipes are closed. Hence, based onWagner’s
model, the relationship between actual demand and node




























































is the actual demand of node 𝑘 at time 𝑡.𝑄req
𝑘,𝑡
is the
required demand of node 𝑘 at time 𝑡. The required demand is
the full demand at the node. It can be obtained as the WDN
performing normally. 𝑃
𝑘,𝑡
is the pressure of node 𝑘 calculated
at time 𝑡. 𝑃min
𝑘
is the minimum pressure of node 𝑘. 𝑃ser
𝑘
is the
service pressure of node 𝑘. 𝑃max
𝑘
is the maximum pressure of
node 𝑘.
There is still a lack of mature and universal hydraulic
analysis software that can support the pressure-driven sim-
ulation method. In consideration of this, the robustness of
WDN under the condition of cascading failures is figured
out in combination with EPANET 2 and the actual demand
function.
2.3. The Cascading Failure Model
2.3.1. EPANET 2. EPANET 2 is used to run the hydraulic
simulation. EPANET 2 [21] is open source software devel-
oped by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). EPANET 2 can simulate the water hydraulic and
water quality of WDN in a certain period of time. The
gradient algorithm proposed by Todini and Pilati [22] is
combined in EPANET 2 to find a solution for steady flow
equations. EPANET 2 has been widely applied because of its
high computing speed and satisfactory simulation effect. In
terms of academic study, EPANET 2 is nearly deemed as the
standard computing engine due to the accurate computing
result and good compatibility [19, 23, 24].
The numerical simulation of WDN is implemented by
calling Toolkit from EPANET 2 through MATLAB under
the failure condition. EPANET 2 has provided the users with
Toolkits, which is implemented by the way of dynamic link
library (DLL) technology. It allows developers to customize
computing engine of EPANET 2 according to their specific
demands. The “.inp” output file of EPANET 2 has presented a
targeted development approach that can be embedded in the
optimal design or parameter analysis to increase the function
of aided analysis.The process of MATLAB calling EPANET 2
Toolkits with pressure-driven strategy is shown in Figure 1.
2.3.2. Attack Pattern. Cascading failures can be triggered by
random attack and intentional attack [25, 26]. Random attack
means destroying a network component randomly. Inten-
tional attack means damaging a certain network component
according to some selection strategies. The target of random
attack is a network component which is selected randomly.
The target of international attack is a network component
with some special feature, for example, the most connected
node, the highest betweenness node, or the lowest between-
ness node. Attack on the special component can cause a
more rapid network failure. These special components can
be regard as vulnerability components. When the network
information is entirely unknown, the components in the
network can only be attacked randomly. However, in actual
network, the vulnerability differs from component to com-
ponent. When the network information can be completely or
partially obtained, the network can be break down rapidly if
priority is given to the vulnerable ones.
From the perspective of infrastructure protection, the
intentional attack is chosen. The actual network shows high
tolerance for random failures. As revealed by the researches
of network security, the attack against a critical component
is likely to cause cascading failures on large scale and even
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MATLAB call EPANET 2 library
functions
EPANET 2 compute water flow and
pressure; MATLAB read the calculation
results
Use pressure-driven strategy in
MATLAB
MATLAB call functions and open a water
network
Update water information. Calculate water
flow and pressure in EPANET 2
Start
Transmit calculation results to MATLAB
End
Transmit calculation results to EPANET 2
Figure 1: Flowchart of MATLAB calling EPANET 2 Toolkits.
the entirely network [6]. Both the random attack and the
intentional attack can incur the loss of network performance.
However, if the intentional attack happens to the critical
components of the network, the destruction of the network
performance is likely to occur.
Hence, the intentional attack is the choice in this paper.
The attack target is constituted by the node-based attacks.The
failure of the nodes or pipes in WDN causes changes to the
topological structure and water properties. It is necessary to
update the WDN model before the hydraulic analysis. The
update of WDN involves two aspects: (1) the update of the
topological structure, such as shutting down the pipes within
the influencing scope of accidents and (2) recalculating the
water demand within the influencing scope. Therefore, the
influence of node failure inWDNcan be described as follows:
after node failure, the node will be isolated to prevent loss and
spread; that is, the failure node is removed out of WDN. In
EPANET 2, the actual demand is set as zero and the upstream
and downstream pipes associated with the failure node are
shut down. The stop of cascading failures of the WDN is
defined as no new failure nodes or pipes appeared, that is, the
network returns to stable state again. The flowchart of node-
based attack in WDN can be seen in Figure 2.
2.4. The Emergency Model
2.4.1. The Resource Threshold Value. New failure nodes
appear after the intentional attack. The failure nodes may
trigger the hydraulic redistribution of WDN. However, in
real life, emergency response can help people to reduce
losses. After a natural disaster, manpower with technical
support, vehicles, and emergency supplies are involved in the
recovery activities to fight the disaster. Manpower, vehicles,
and emergency supplies can be regarded as external emer-
gency resources. These external emergency resources play a
signification role in network recovery and disaster relief.
The ith node fails
Update the network topological
structure
Recalculate the water demand
Is there new avalanched node or pipe?
Yes
A new round of load redistribution
End
No
Figure 2: Flowchart of the node-based attack in WDN.
The threshold value of the emergence resources is defined.







× (1 + 𝛽) . (5)







× (1 − 𝛽) , (6)
where 𝑃min
𝑘
is the minimum pressure of node 𝑘, 𝑃max
𝑘
is the
maximum pressure of node 𝑘, and 𝛽 is the parameter of
external emergency resources.With the definition of the low-
pressure resource threshold value and high-pressure resource
threshold value, the original water pressure in WDN is
expanded from three (i.e., minimum pressure, maximum
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P
min Presmin Pser P
res
max Pmax
Figure 3: The relationship of node pressure.
pressure, and service pressure) to five. The relationship is
shown in Figure 3.
(1) When the node pressure is smaller than theminimum
pressure, the excessively low water pressure leads to
flow interruption and short supply. The node actual
demand becomes zero. External emergency resources
can be introduced for restoration.
(2) When the node water pressure is greater than the
minimum pressure but smaller than the low-pressure
resource threshold, the node suffers low-pressure
challenge. If the external resources are not intro-
duced, thewater pressurewill keep declining and then
lead to flow interruption. In this situation, external
emergency resources can be introduced to restore
the nodes within the interval of the water pressures
mentioned above.
(3) When the node water pressure is higher than the low-
pressure resource threshold but lower than the service
pressure, thewater is supplied in a reduction level.The
actual demand can be calculated with (4).
(4) When the node water pressure is higher than the
service water pressure but lower than the high-
pressure resource threshold, the node maintains nor-
mal supply.The actual demand is equal to the required
demand.
(5) When the node water pressure is higher than the
high-pressure resource threshold but lower than the
maximum pressure, the node suffers high-pressure
challenge. If the external resources are not intro-
duced, the pipe burst may arise from the continuous
increase in water pressure. In this situation, external
emergency resources can be introduced to restore
the nodes within the interval of the water pressures
mentioned above.
(6) When the node water pressure is higher than the
maximum pressure, it easily results in pipe burst and
then cascading failures. Under this circumstance, the
node fails and the actual flow is zero. In view of this,
the node can be restored by the external emergency
resources.
2.4.2. The Load Redistribution. The water pressures of every
node can be obtained by the recalculation of network
hydraulic under failure conditions. Judge the interval of
water pressure where the node pressure exists. Suppose the
water pressure of node 𝑘 is 𝑃
𝑘,𝑡
at time 𝑡. The external
emergency resources should be distributed to the nodes with
the recovery strategies if 𝑃
𝑘,𝑡
is greater than the maximum
resource threshold or smaller than the minimum resource
threshold. After restoration, the final load is 𝑃󸀠
𝑘,𝑡
. The load




































represents the weight for node 𝑘 at time 𝑡. The
weight describes the resources that are introduced accord-
ing to different recovery strategies. 𝑅 is the total available
resources. According to (7), after the node is allocated with
a certain quantity of emergency resources, the final load 𝑃󸀠
𝑘,𝑡
suggests that node 𝑘 only has three states, that is, the normal
state (𝑃res
𝑘,min < 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 < 𝑃
res











𝑘,min or 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑘,max).
The node with the challenge state can still ensure water
supply. However, if the node suffers avalanche, the node fails
and then it is removed out of the WDN.
2.4.3. The Recovery Strategies. The weight definition based
on node betweenness in scale-free network can diminish the
avalanched size resulting from cascading failures [27]. Hence,
in this paper, weight is devoted to formulating the recovery
strategies from three aspects including uniform distribution,
node betweenness, and node pressure. The recovery strate-
gies are considered from two aspects, that is, the network
topological structure and the collapse information.The node












(𝑘) is the shortest path between node 𝑎 and node 𝑏
passing through node 𝑘.𝜎
𝑎𝑏
is the sumof all the shortest paths
between node 𝑎 and node 𝑏. In most cascading failure studies
[28–30], node betweenness is used to measure the network
topological property. It evaluates the node influence from the
aspect of topology. The larger the node betweenness is, the
greater the influence will be.
The recovery strategies (RSs) are described as follows.
RS 1: the resources are distributed to all nodes uni-
formly.
RS 2: the resources are distributed to all nodes
according to the node betweenness.
RS 3: the resources are uniformly distributed to the
challenged nodes.
RS 4: the resources are distributed to the avalanched
nodes uniformly. If there are no avalanchednodes, the
resources are uniformly distributed to the challenged
nodes.
RS 5: the resources are distributed to the avalanched
nodes according to node betweenness. If there are no
avalanched nodes, the resources are distributed to the
challenged nodes according to node betweenness.
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RS 6: the resources are distributed to the avalanched
nodes according to the node pressure. If there are no
avalanched nodes, the resources are distributed to the
challenged nodes according to the node pressure.
RS 7: no emergency resource is introduced to the
WDN.
Among all the strategies above, RS 2 is based on the
network topological structure while RSs 3∼6 are based on the
network topological structure and the breakdown informa-
tion.
2.5.The Robustness Evaluation Index. The robustness indexes
are introduced from [31].
The relative size of the nodes 𝐺 in the largest connected
























where𝑁󸀠 is the nodes in the largest connected component of
WDN after the cascading failures stop, 𝑁 is the number of





of the avalanched and the challenged nodes inWDN after the
stop of the cascading failures resulting from the attack against
node 𝑖, and 𝑇 is the total number of iterations that measure
the time steps of cascade propagation in the network.
𝐺 reflects the largest connected component after cascad-
ing failures. It can quantify the robustness of structure against
cascading failures. The network has good robustness as 𝐺
approaches one.On the contrary, AS evaluates the avalanched
size. The network has poor robustness as AS approaches one.
CS describes the challenged condition. If effective recovery
strategy can be given to these nodes, the possibility of network
back to normal operation can be improved. In addition, 𝑉
measures the quantity of avalanched nodes in unit time. The
smaller the 𝑉 is, the less the collapse nodes per unit time will
be.
2.6. Simulation. The simulation process is described in Fig-
ure 4.
Step 1. Call the EPANET 2 Toolkits through MATLAB.
Upload topological structure and basic data of WDN.
Step 2. Calculate the capacity according to (2) and the
resource threshold value according to ((5)-(6)).
Step 3. Choose the initial failure node according to the attack
strategy.
Step 4. Compute thewater pressure of each node by EPANET
2.
Step 5. Record the new avalanched and challenged nodes
resulting from the initial attack.
Step 6. Calculate the recovery amount of each node accord-
ing to the recovery strategies.
Step 7. Introduce the emergency resources and restore node
pressure according to (7).
Step 8. Update the actual demand according to the restored
water pressure.The updated actual demands are used as node
demand of next iteration.
Step 9. If there is new avalanched node or pipe, the iterations
should continue. Otherwise, the cascading effect stops and
attention should be switched to Step 10.
Step 10. Repeat Steps 3–9 until all nodes failure have been
simulated.
Step 11. Compute the robustness assessment indexes of
WDN.
3. Case Study
A WDN from Shuang et al. [14] is used as an example.
The network is represented as 17 nodes and 21 pipes. The
network topological structure, node elevation, base demand,
pipe diameter, length, and Hazen-William roughness are
shown in Figure 5. The total head is 30m. The total pipe
length is 23.55 km. The pipe lengths range from 800m to
1700m.Thepipe diameters vary from 150mmto 350mm.The
base demands vary from 6.94 L/s to 13.89 L/s. The minimum
pressure of every node is 6m.
EPANET 2 is used to calculate the node pressure under
normal condition.The node pressure is shown in Table 1.The
pressure of node 14 is the smallest; 𝑃
14
= 7.12m.The pressure
of node 1 is the largest; 𝑃
1
= 30m.
The acceptable minimum pressure of all consumer nodes
is 6m. The maximum pressure is figured out through (2).
Since the original literature does not contain the maximum
capacity, the value range of tolerance parameter 𝛼 is defined
as 0∼1.0 to cover all possible maximum capacities.
As shown in Figure 5, this WDN belongs to the small-
size network. Therefore, in order to evaluate the recovery
strategies, the cascading failure process from node 1 to node
17 is simulated successively to calculate the relative size𝐺, the
avalanched size AS, the challenged size CS, and the cascade
propagation velocity 𝑉 of every node until the network
becomes stable again.The evaluation result with each 𝛼 is the
average [32] of evaluation index from node 1 to node 17.
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Upload topological structure and basic 
data of WDN
Calculate the capacity and the 
resource threshold value of each node



























The ith node fail
t = t + 1
Calculate the recovery amount
Is there new avalanched node or pipe?
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Pk,t

























































Figure 4: The flowchart of the cascade-based emergency model.
Set the total available resources as𝑅 = 0.5.The simulation
is implemented according to the flowchart shown in Figure 4.
The simulation results can be seen in Figures 6–9.
Firstly, the black line in Figures 6–9 shows the net-
work performance of WDN under cascading effect without
emergency resource. It can be seen that despite the increase in
tolerance parameter 𝛼, the relative size 𝐺 without emergency
resource is smaller than that at the time when the emergency
resources are introduced. The avalanched size AS is higher
than the emergency introduced situation.The challenged size
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Figure 5: The layout of WDN.



















CS is lower than the emergency introduced situation. This
is because most of the nodes are avalanched resulting from
cascading effect. Besides, the cascade propagation velocity 𝑉
is greater, which means more nodes are avalanched per time.
Secondly, Figure 6 describes the simulation results of the
relative size𝐺with different recovery strategies. According to
the relative size 𝐺, the RS 6 (the resources are distributed to
the avalanched nodes according to the node pressure. If there
are no avalanched nodes, the resources are distributed to the
challenged nodes according to the node pressure.) can resist
against cascading failures and protect the critical components
in the network more effectively after the external resources
are introduced intoWDN. For example, when 𝛼 = 0.70,𝐺
6
=
0.7197, the network connectivity is 0.1626 higher than that
without the use of emergency resources. It can be found that
RS 3 achieves poor performance. Although the challenged
nodes may fail, it can still operate and supply water. Hence,
resources should be firstly supplied for the avalanched nodes.
The repair of avalanched nodes can effectively improve the
entire robustness of WDN.
Thirdly, Figure 7 describes the simulation results of
the avalanched size AS with different recovery strategies.
The recovery strategies should be effective to reduce the
avalanched nodes. Measures are taken to repair the network
and enhance the robustness. It can be found in Figure 7
that there are situations in which the avalanched nodes
with recovery strategies are higher than RS 7 (i.e., strategy
without emergency resource), for example, when 𝛼 = 0.17∼
0.19 and 0.27∼0.28, AS (RS 1) > AS (RS 7); when 𝛼 = 0.17∼
0.29, AS (RS 3) > AS (RS 7); and when 𝛼 = 0.17∼0.20, AS
(RS 5) > AS (RS 7). RS 1 distributes resources to all nodes
uniformly. It does not distinguish between the avalanched
nodes and the challenged nodes. This leads to the allocation
of resources lacking of focus. RS 3 distributes resources to
the challenged nodes uniformly, which ignores the effective
repair of the avalanched nodes. RS 5 distributes resources to
the avalanched nodes according to node betweenness. Node
betweenness considers the network topological structure but
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 9


























Figure 6: The simulation results of the relative size 𝐺 with different
recovery strategies.
𝛼




























Figure 7: The simulation results of the avalanched size AS with
different recovery strategies.
𝛼




























Figure 8: The simulation results of the challenged size CS with
different recovery strategies.
𝛼






























Figure 9:The simulation results of the cascade propagation velocity
𝑉 with different recovery strategies.
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Table 2: Different frequencies between RS 6 and other RSs.
Frequency <0 =0 >0
RS 6 – RS 1 0.8416 0.0297 0.1287
RS 6 – RS 2 0.7921 0.0198 0.1881
RS 6 – RS 3 0.9505 0.0297 0.0198
RS 6 – RS 4 0.6337 0.1881 0.1782
RS 6 – RS 5 0.8020 0.0099 0.1881
RS 6 – RS 7 0.9901 0.0000 0.0099
not the hydraulic property. Hence, there is a deviation on the
distribution of the avalanched nodes. Moreover, the AS of RS
2, RS 4, and RS 6 are lower than RS 7 in any state of 𝛼. AS
(RS 2) are higher than AS (RS 4) and AS (RS 6). Comparing
RS 4 and RS 6, the times of AS (RS 6) < AS (RS 4) are 52; the
times of AS (RS 6) = AS (RS 4) are 41; and the times of AS (RS
6) > AS (RS 4) are 8. Therefore, RS 6 can reduce the number
of avalanched nodes more effectively and produce the best
protection effect compared with other RSs.
Fourthly, Figure 8 describes the simulation results of the
challenged size CS with different recovery strategies. When
𝛼 ranges from 0.53 to 0.8, the challenged nodes arising from
the six RSs are identical. When 𝛼 is smaller than 0.53, RSs
4 and 6 produce more challenged nodes compared with the
other RSs. RS 3 is capable of lessening the challenged nodes,
mainly because this strategy has allocated resources to the
challenged ones. However, on the contrary, RS 3 shows poor
performance in terms of the relative and the avalanched size.
Fifthly, Figure 9 describes the simulation results of the
cascade propagation velocity𝑉with different recovery strate-
gies. The cascade propagation velocity 𝑉measures the quan-
tity of avalanched nodes in unit time. 𝑉 considers the total
avalanched nodes after cascade-effect stops and the cascading
spread time. Therefore, the smaller the 𝑉 is, the less the
avalanched nodes per time produced. To better compare the
recovery strategies, the difference frequencies between RS
6 and other RSs are calculated. Table 2 shows the result.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2 describe the frequencies
indicating that𝑉 (RS 6) is smaller than the other RSs,𝑉 (RS 6)
is equal to the other RSs, and𝑉 (RS 6) is larger than the other
RSs, respectively. From data in Table 2, RS 6 has the lowest
number of avalanched nodes per time, which has effectively
decreased the avalanched velocity of the cascading failures.
As shown in Figures 6–9, uniform recovery distribution
according to challenged nodes (i.e., RS 3) has the lowest
ability to resist against cascading failures. In this regard,
however, the uniform recovery distribution of all nodes (i.e.,
RS 1) is parallel to the recovery distribution of all nodes
according to node betweenness (i.e., RS 2). RS 4 and RS
6 produce good result. According to the analysis discussed
above, the RS 6 can heighten the connectivity of the system
and reduce the avalanched nodes and the number of the
avalanchednodes that emerge in unit time effectively.Though
RS 6 cannot lessen the challenged nodes, the challenged
nodes can still supply water to guarantee the functions of
WDN. Therefore, the RS 6 is capable of resisting against the
cascading failures of WDN effectively.
4. Conclusion
WDN constitutes a significant part in infrastructure system.
In this paper, attention is paid to studying the recovery
strategies of urban WDN with cascading failures. The choice
of the best strategy to fight the cascading failures is discussed.
The case study manifests that the recovery strategy of node
pressure, that is, the RS 6, is able to improve the connectivity
of theWDN. Besides, this strategy can reduce the avalanched
nodes and the number of avalanched nodes per time. The
result shows that the recovery strategy based on node pres-
sure is superior to that based on node betweenness. WDN
is a kind of physical network, which is different from virtual
network. Focus should be paid not only on the network
topological, but also on the hydraulic property. The node
pressure strategy considers both the topology structure and
the balance of water supply and demand, which makes this
strategy superior to others.
Further research should focus on the resource generation
function to study the influence of time-based recovery strat-
egy. To resist against the propagation of the cascading failures
inWDN, efforts should be spent in establishing resource and
cost constraint functions to study how to restore the network
components effectively by limited resources and limited
cost. In addition, to recognize node conditions, monitoring
device with the functions of on-line monitoring and sensors
for detecting pressure and flow should be installed on the
real WDN. With the help of monitoring, the cascade-based
emergency model can provide a more realistic result.
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